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Making Prisons Safe: 
Strategies for Reducing Violence 
Donald Specter* 
INTRODUCTION 
Most people assume that prisons are dangerous because they 
house violent convicts. In California, for example, the union 
representing prison guards emphasizes the danger by calling the job 
“the toughest beat in the state.”1 Yet, in the last twenty years in only 
one California prison guard has been killed by a prisoner, but 
hundreds of prisoners have died from medical neglect, suicide, or 
guard brutality. Prisons are dangerous, but they are far more 
dangerous than they need to be.  
If prison administrators provide humane conditions and require 
strict adherence to commonly accepted and nationally recognized 
techniques for regulating the unnecessary use of force, prisons can be 
reasonably safe for both prisoners and staff. Although the threat 
posed by gangs presents special problems, the traditional approach to 
correctional safety—suppression and isolation—has not been 
successful. The experiences of some innovative programs around the 
country, as discussed below, suggests the success of a radically 
 
 * This article is based on testimony to the Commission on Safety and Abuse in 
America’s Prisons, April 2005. Donald Specter, J.D. is the Director of the Prison Law Office, a 
nonprofit public interest law firm located near San Francisco, California. The Prison Law 
Office provides free legal services to California state prisoners related to the conditions of their 
confinement. During the past thirty years the office has successfully sued California adult and 
juvenile facilities over virtually all prison conditions, many of which directly relate to the safety 
of prisoners, the excessive use of force, and the state’s response to prison gangs. More 
information about these cases is available at the Prison Law Office website. See Prison Law 
Office, http://www.prisonlaw.com (last visited July 8, 2006).  
 1. See California Correctional Peace Officers Association, http://www.CCPOA.org (last 
visited July 8, 2006). 
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different approach: closely monitored integration coupled with 
incentives and tools to help prisoners leave the gangs. 
THE CAUSE AND CONTROL OF PRISON VIOLENCE 
The Supreme Court recently stated that “[p]risons are dangerous 
places.”2 The Court implied that prisons are dangerous because 
prisoners are violent.3 Some prisoners are violent and will be violent 
no matter what the circumstances, but the degree of institutional 
violence is not dependent on the prisoners. It is a direct product of 
prison conditions and how the state operates its prisons.  
American prisons promote violence and abuse by their design and 
operation. The anti-social nature of the prisoners themselves is not 
solely responsible for violent and abusive behavior. In the Stanford 
Prison Experiment otherwise psychologically healthy, normal 
Stanford college students changed dramatically after spending six 
days as guards and prisoners in a mock prison.4 The “prisoners” 
began to perceive each other as the guards perceived them and 
progressively expressed more frequent intentions to harm others:  
The guards, too—who also had been carefully chosen on the 
basis of their normal-average scores on a variety of personality 
 
 2. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005). 
 3. Id. Threats to the safety of prisoners also spring from other, less obvious sources. In 
our experience, the single biggest threat to prisoners’ lives is the absence of adequate and 
appropriate health care. Neglect and malpractice kills more prisoners than do guards or other 
prisoners. Although difficult to quantify, death and serious injury due to medical neglect, 
preventable suicides, and mental decompensation far exceeds the harm caused by the more 
overt uses of force. For example, in 2003 only fourteen California prisoners were killed by 
other prisoners or staff. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, INMATE INCIDENTS IN 
INSTITUTIONS: CALENDAR YEAR 2003, at 15 (2004), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ 
ReportsResearch/OffenderInfoServices/Annual/Beh1Archive.html (follow “December 2003” 
hyperlink). 
 In a recent independent review of 193 recent deaths in California’s prisons, court-appointed 
medical experts found eleven cases of terrible medical care in 2003. A review by a court-
appointed special master of suicides within California’s prisons in 2003 found that out of thirty-
five suicides, twenty-five (74%) received inadequate treatment and were foreseeable or 
preventable. Coleman v. Wilson, Special Master’s Report on Suicides Committed in the 
California Department of Corrections in Calendar Year 2003, at 8 (2004). Therefore, although it 
is beyond the scope of this presentation, any analysis of safety failures and abuse must consider 
the effects of ineffective prison health care systems. 
 4. Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy, 53 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 709 (1998). 
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measures—quickly internalized their randomly assigned role. 
Many of these seemingly gentle and caring young men, some 
of whom had described themselves as pacifists or Vietnam 
War “doves,” soon began mistreating their peers and were 
indifferent to the obvious suffering that their actions produced. 
Several of them devised sadistically inventive ways to harass 
and degrade the prisoners, and none of the less actively cruel 
mock-guards ever intervened or complained about the abuses 
they witnessed.5 
The conclusions of this experiment have profound implications 
for the control of violence in our prisons:  
The negative, anti-social reactions observed were not the 
product of an environment created by combining a collection 
of deviant personalities, but rather the result of an intrinsically 
pathological situation which could distort and rechannel the 
behaviour of essentially normal individuals. The abnormality 
here resided in the psychological nature of the situation and not 
in those who passed through it.6 
In other words, the Stanford Prison Experiment teaches that prisons, 
as an institution, tend to promote aggressive and violent behavior by 
correctional personnel.7 
The state is responsible for controlling that type of behavior. The 
elements necessary to control the use of force in prisons are well 
known. To prevent abuse, the use of force must be controlled through 
(1) clear policies; (2) meaningful and constant supervision of all uses 
of force; (3) timely and truthful reporting of all uses of force by the 
officer involved and anyone who witnessed the incident; (4) an 
accurate and unbiased investigation into allegations of excessive 
force; and (5) the consistent imposition of progressive and 
proportional discipline when excessive force is used or when it is not 
 
 5. Id. at 709. 
 6. Id. at 710 (citation omitted). 
 7. Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J. 
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 93–94 (1973). 
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reported.8 A breakdown in any one of these components will 
inevitably lead to abuse.9  
Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for correctional supervisors to 
lose control over the use of force, resulting in abuse. Abu Ghraib,10 
Pelican Bay State Prison in California,11 the entire prison system of 
Texas,12 and Rikers Island in New York City13 are prime examples of 
prisons that became more dangerous not because of the prisoners, but 
because of management breakdowns that let guards mistreat and 
dehumanize their captives.  
The abuse at Abu Ghraib is especially important to consider 
because two factors distinguish it from other situations. Like the 
Stanford Prison Experiment, and unlike maximum security prisons 
where prisoners are considered extremely dangerous, in Abu Ghraib 
there was no public suggestion that the prisoners were especially 
threatening or that their conduct caused the guards to act abusively. 
This is a clear demonstration that the situation, rather than the 
prisoners themselves, was responsible for the guards’ misconduct. 
The United States Army’s investigation into the abuses at Abu 
Ghraib revealed another factor that can cause an institution to spiral 
 
 8. See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 1995), rev’d and 
remanded by 150 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1998); U.S. ARMY SPECIAL REPORT, INVESTIGATION OF 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB 2–5 (2004), available at http://www4.army.mil/ 
ocpa/reports/ar15-6/ar15-6.pdf (citing lack of effective leadership, ambiguous policies, 
inadequate resources, and ineffective supervision and discipline as reasons for the abuses). 
 9. This was proven true in California by the special master appointed by the federal court 
to monitor the conditions at Pelican Bay who conducted an inquiry into the code of silence 
within the California Department of Corrections. Madrid v. Gomez, Special Master’s Report Re 
Department of Corrections “Post Powers” Investigations and Employee Discipline (Jan. 15, 
2004). The inquiry arose from the decision of the director of the Department of Corrections to 
terminate the investigation of perjury by several correctional officers in a federal civil rights 
trial for excessive force against prisoners. The special master concluded,  
A minority of rogue officers can establish a code of silence, threaten the majority, 
damage cars, isolate uncooperative co-workers, and create an overall atmosphere of 
deceit and corruption. And if the minority are supported by a powerful labor 
organization, and the union as well as management condones the code of silence, the 
consequences are severe. 
Id. at 99.  
 10. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 8. 
 11. See Madrid, 889 F. Supp. 1146. 
 12. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1302 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
 13. See Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/10
p125 Specter book pages.doc  11/20/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  Making Prisons Safe 129 
 
 
out of control: the injection of an external rationale for 
mistreatment.14 In addition to finding the usual management 
breakdowns in the control of force the Army investigators also 
recognized that the “war on terror” and the corresponding need to 
obtain intelligence were perceived by the soldiers at Abu Ghraib as a 
license to exceed the bounds of sanctioned conduct.15  
A similar license was granted to guards in California that led to 
even more serious abuse, often causing permanent injury and death. 
At Pelican Bay, guards were led to believe that extreme force was 
justified by the need to punish and control the “worst of the worst.”16 
As soon as the prison opened, officials let the guards know that the 
standard rules of conduct would not apply at Pelican Bay. What 
followed were not only individual instances of brutality, but a 
deliberate practice of using violence and pain to control prisoners’ 
behavior.17 Ruling on a constitutional challenge to the excessive use 
of force at Pelican Bay, the Federal District Court for the Northern 
District of California catalogued unnecessary and excessively violent 
cell-extractions, hog-tying of prisoners, caging of naked prisoners 
outside for long periods of time in cold and rainy weather, and staff 
beatings of prisoners.18 It concluded that violence was used by staff 
“not only in good faith efforts to restore and maintain order, but also 
for the very purpose of inflicting punishment and pain.”19 
This attitude pervaded other California maximum security prisons 
as well. In the mid-1990s California was confronted with the 
gruesome spectacle of guards in the Security Housing Unit at 
Corcoran State Prison purposefully releasing rival gang members in 
small exercise yards and betting on which of the “gladiators” would 
 
 14. U.S. ARMY SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 5. 
 15. The army acknowledged this problem in typical bureaucratic and understated fashion: 
“Demands on the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities in a counterinsurgency and in the 
future joint operational environment will continue to tax tactical and strategic assets.” Id. at 6. 
 16. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1155.  
 17. In one instance, guards placed an African American mentally ill prisoner in a bathtub 
so hot that it caused third-degree burns and made his skin peel off parts of his body and hang in 
large clumps around his legs, which had turned white. Id. at 1166–67. This was in retaliation for 
the man biting a guard one week earlier. Id. at 1166. A prison nurse overheard a guard remark, 
“[L]ooks like we’re going to have a white boy before this is through . . . .” Id. at 1167. 
 18. Id. at 1162–78.  
 19. Id. at 1200. 
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be victorious.20 And in 2004 a videotape showed “counselors” at the 
California Youth Authority’s maximum security prison mercilessly 
beating wards as they lay passively on the day room floor.21 
These and other scandals that have plagued California’s prison 
system for the last fifteen years were not hidden, nor were they 
accidents. They were known and tolerated by high-level correctional 
administrators who showed complete indifference to the lives and 
well-being of prisoners. Their utter failure to strictly and 
appropriately regulate the use of force in a manner consistent with 
nationally recognized principles of correctional administration was 
responsible for untold suffering. 
The regulation of force is, by itself, insufficient to prevent abuse. 
Prison conditions can and do breed violence. Many prisoners have 
committed violent crimes, and many suffer from mental illnesses that 
inhibit their ability to control their own behavior.22 When such 
inmates are placed together in overcrowded, antiquated facilities with 
inadequate mental health services and nothing constructive to do 
violence is inevitable.23 
The California Inspector General made clear the connection 
between conditions and violence when he found that deplorable 
conditions and poor management practices contributed to the murder 
of a correctional officer at the California Institution for Men.24 The 
 
 20. AMNESTY INT’L, CALIFORNIAN PRISONS: FAILURE TO PROTECT PRISONERS FROM 
ABUSE (2000), available at http://origin2.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510792000? 
open&of=ENG-USA.  
 21. See S.F. Gate: Multimedia, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/object/article?o=0&f=/ 
chronicle/archive/2004/04/02/BAGLV5VDLL1.DTL (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). 
 22. A recent survey by the United States Department of Justice found that more than half 
of the nation’s state prisoners had a mental health problem. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. 
GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 213600, MENTAL 
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 tbl.1 (2006). An older survey found that 
16% of prisoners were mentally ill. PAULA M. DITTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 174463, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND 
PROBATIONERS (1999). 
 23. For the connection between overcrowding and violence see, for example, KATHERINE 
BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE 177 (2004); ALEXIS M. DURHAM, 
CRISIS AND REFORM: CURRENT ISSUES IN AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 48–49 (1994); CRAIG 
HANEY, REFORMING PUNISHMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITS TO THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 
202, 205 (2005). 
 24. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL REVIEW INTO THE DEATH OF 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MANUEL A. GONZALEZ, JR. ON JANUARY 10, 2005 AT THE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/10
p125 Specter book pages.doc  11/20/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  Making Prisons Safe 131 
 
 
Inspector General found that the prison violated basic classification 
procedures by permitting the prisoner, who was incarcerated for 
attempting to kill a police officer and had a history of recent and 
serious assaultive behavior, to remain in the general population.25 
Poor maintenance and tool control procedures permitted prisoners to 
obtain and conceal weapons.26 The victim failed to follow specific 
security directives initiated after a race riot, the stabbing of a 
prisoner, and the discovery of weapons in the same unit.27 
Additionally, the warden and her subordinate supervisory staff failed 
to ensure compliance with those directives.28 Finally, nobody 
addressed the prisoner’s clearly identified need for immediate mental 
health treatment.29 
The Inspector General’s findings express in detail what is 
common sense to most correctional administrators: well-run prisons 
are relatively safe, while those that are poorly managed are not. The 
control of violence, therefore, depends not only on executing 
accepted policies for regulating the use and supervision of force, but 
also on the overall management of the facility. All of the prison’s 
operations, including mental health care, must be integrated and 
functioning properly if prisons are to perform their primary purpose 
of incarceration and not subject their inhabitants—both prisoners and 
officers—to an unacceptable risk of injury or death. 
 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR MEN 3–4 (2005), available at www.oig.ca.gov/reports/pdf/ 
Review_03-17-05.pdf. The California Institution for Men is a large, overcrowded intake center 
located near Los Angeles. See California Institute for Men (CIM), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ 
Visitors/fac_prison_CIM.html (last visited July 8, 2006). 
 25. Id. at 16–17. 
 26. Id. at 37. 
 27. Id. at 5. 
 28. Id. at 19–24. 
 29. Id. at 79. The independent panel of experts appointed by the California State Board of 
Corrections also noted the “deplorable” conditions at the prison and the fact that the reception 
center was overcrowded and serving more prisoners than it could safely process.  CAL. STATE 
BD. OF CORRS., INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS AND INCIDENT REVIEW PANEL ON THE CALIFORNIA 
INSTITUTIONS FOR MEN 12 (2005), available at http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/special_reports/ 
operational_incident_review_cim/final%20report.pdf. 
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GANG PREVENTION 
The problem of gang-related violence in America’s prisons is both 
well known and well documented. Both prison and street gangs are 
reportedly responsible for drugs, violence, and intimidation within 
prison walls.30 The traditional prison response to gang behavior is 
suppression and isolation. Gang members are forced to spend long, 
indefinite terms in segregated housing units in maximum or super-
maximum (supermax) security prisons and their misconduct is often 
targeted for administrative or criminal prosecution. 
While the success of these strategies in reducing violence is 
uncertain, it is clear that they have not succeeded in eliminating 
gangs or their influence. It is commonly understood that, while 
locked in segregation, gang leaders continue to control the illegal 
activities of their members both within the prison and in the outside 
community. Perhaps the most graphic example of this is the fact that 
several California prison gang leaders are now facing the death 
penalty for federal criminal charges arising from their activities while 
imprisoned in the Security Housing Unit (SHU) at Pelican Bay, a 
supermax facility.31 
Prisoners in restricted units such as Pelican Bay’s SHU are not 
provided any form of meaningful recreation, education, vocational 
training, or rehabilitative services.32 They are left in their cells every 
day for up to twenty-three hours, with the remaining hour being spent 
either alone or with their cellmate in a small enclosed space that 
approximates a dog run.33 In this environment normal social 
relationships are impossible and these inmates are left to associate 
with other gang members. It is not surprising, therefore, that they will 
continue to perpetuate the gang and its activities; they have nothing 
else to do.  
 
 30. See, e.g., GEORGE F. COLE & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 
(2005). 
 31. Press Release, Thom Mrozek, Pub. Affairs Officer, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Cent. Dist. 
of Cal., Racketeering Indictment Targets Aryan Brotherhood (Oct. 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pr2002/152.html.  
 32. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1995), rev’d and remanded by 
150 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 33. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/10
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Recently, some correctional systems have developed successful 
programs that use the opposite approach. Instead of using extreme 
forms of isolation these programs actively promote integration. Their 
aim is to reintegrate the gang member into the general prison 
population. In the few programs that take this approach, the strategy 
has proven surprisingly successful. 
These programs—utilized in Connecticut,34 Missouri’s Division 
of Youth Services,35 and the Pelican Bay Transitional Housing 
Unit36—have several things in common. First, they create housing 
units that are relatively small, consisting of between fifteen and 
twenty prisoners. Second, the adult programs allow the prisoner to 
choose to participate, although one program conditions that choice on 
the decision to inform against his former gang. Third, they create a 
set of expectations that include mandatory integration with prisoners 
of other races and gangs, and a very low tolerance of misbehavior. 
Fourth, prisoners are given extensive orientation about these 
expectations. Fifth, prisoners are provided with counseling services to 
help them control anger and violence and foster healthy relationships. 
These services come in the form of formal group sessions, but also 
informally through guidance provided by specially selected staff in 
the units. Finally, prisoners are provided with real and substantial 
incentives to complete the program. This may include contact visits 
with their family, jobs and a safe environment when they return to the 
general population. 
The success rate in each of these three programs is reportedly very 
high. Connecticut and Missouri report that the recidivism rate of gang 
members is under 10%.37 In California, prison officials report that 
only 5% of prisoners fail to complete the program, the recidivism rate 
 
 34. See Connecticut Department of Correction, http://www.ct.gov/doc/ (follow 
“Recidivism” hyperlink) (describing Connecticut’s Gang Management Program).  
 35. See Missouri Division of Youth Services, http://www.dss.mo.gov/dys/ (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2006). 
 36. See  Pelican Bay State Prison, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Visitors/fac_prison_PBSP.html 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2006). 
 37. Department of Correction, supra note 34. Recidivism in these states is measured 
differently. In Connecticut, the test is whether the prisoner is redesignated as a gang member. 
Id. Missouri uses the more traditional measure of whether the person reoffends. Telephone 
interview with Mark Steward, former Dir. of Mo. Div. of Youth Servs., Mo. Dept. of Soc. 
Servs. (2004). 
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after parole is one-third of the norm, and that less than a handful are 
sent back to segregation for gang-related activities.38 
These successful programs place the prisoner or ward in a culture 
where violence is not “business as usual” and provide them with the 
tools they need to succeed. They prove to prisoners who have never 
had a meaningful conversation with a rival gang member or a 
prisoner of another race that they can live a different, less violent, and 
more meaningful life. Instead of creating a culture of suppression and 
isolation, they provide a transition to a more normal way of life, even 
if it is limited to the confines of the prison. Given time and help, the 
prisoners adapt to this culture and recognize its value. 
These promising programs should be studied, evaluated, and 
replicated. They offer positive alternatives to the traditional reaction 
to prison gangs. It is an approach that uses the institution of a prison 
to create positive change rather than to promote further violence. 
CONCLUSION 
It is easy to blame prisoners for prison violence. But, the lessons 
of the last few decades of court intervention and academic research 
have demonstrated that the amount of violence in a prison is a 
function of its culture, the effectiveness of its management, and, at 
times, the political reality that excuses the mistreatment of prisoners. 
No prison illustrated this better than Pelican Bay in the early 1990s. It 
suffered from an administration that condoned and perpetuated 
violence, it opened at a time when being tough on crime meant 
brutalizing prisoners and there was no effective management of the 
prison. The violence in that institution has largely subsided through 
better management required by intensive court intervention, and 
promising inroads have been made into gang membership through the 
Transitional Housing Unit program, demonstrating clearly that it is 
not the prisoners but the prison as an institution that is the key to 
safety in correctional facilities. 
 
 38. Telephone interview with Ted Roberts & Chris Hizer, Mgmt. Staff, Transitional Hous. 
Unit, Pelican Bay State Prison (Apr. 8, 2005).  
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